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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LIE DETECTORS IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
"Polygraph them all. I don't know anything about polygraphs
and I don't know how accurate they are, but I know they'll scare
the hell out of people."
Richard M. Nixon
July 24, 1971 *
Senate Bill 432, proposed during the 1974 regular session of the
Louisiana legislature, would have prohibited the use of the lie detec-
tor in employment and pre-employment screening. The bill would
also have made it illegal for any employer or lie detector operator to
transmit the results of a lie detector test to third persons. Despite the
bill's failure in committee,' its introduction served to call attention
to the major legal problems presented by employers' use of the lie
detection method as a security measure.
At the heart of the legal controversy over employers' use of lie
detectors are the conflicting interests of employer and employee. The
employer's legitimate property interest in the security of his business
and his prerogatives in predicating employment decisions upon stan-
dards of his own choosing are pitted against the interests of employ-
ees in personal privacy and in having decision-making affecting their
job security based upon accurate data. Certain basic precepts of con-
stitutional law, although applicable only to governmental action and
not to private employer conduct, indicate a deep-rooted suspicion of
the use of the device by forces wielding power over the individual.
The constitutional objection most frequently made to the lie
detector is that it invades the constitutional right of privacy of the
individual,2 recognized by the United States Supreme Court in the
landmark decision of Griswold v. C6nnecticut. The untrammeled use
*Hearings Before the House Judiciary Committee on the Impeachment of the
President, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., Statement of Information, bk. VII, pt. 2 at 881 (1974).
1. LA. S. JouR., 37th Reg. Sess., vol. 1 at 718 (1974).
2. See, e.g., State v. Community Distrib., Inc., 64 N.J. 479, 317 A.2d 697 (1974);
Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 307, 494 P.2d 485 (1972)
(dissenting opinion); Bowman Transp. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 837 (1973); Lag Drug Co., 39
Lab. Arb. 1121 (1962).
3. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right to privacy was first enunciated in 1890 as the
"right to be let alone." Brandeis & Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rv. 193
(1890). The first significant recognition of the right to privacy came in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885). The next seventy-five years saw sporadic development
of the right in various fields. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Public
Util. Comm. v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1952); Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 372 (1937).
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of lie detectors in searches conducted by state officials may also be
constitutionally infirm under the rationale of Katz v. United States,'
which held that the fourth amendment "protects people-and not
simply 'areas.' "" That improper use of the polygraph may infringe
upon the right against self-incrimination was indicated by the United
States Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California:'
Some tests seemingly directed to obtain "physical evidence," for
example, lie detector tests measuring changes in body function
during interrogation, may actually be directed to eliciting respon-
ses which are essentially testimonial. To compel a person to sub-
mit to testing in which an effort will be made to determine his
guilt or innocence on the basis of physiological responses, whether
willed or not, is to evoke the spirit and history of the Fifth
Amendment.'
Finally, scientific evidence used in criminal trials must meet certain
basic standards of reliability to fulfill the requirements of due process
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.8 In Frye v. United
States,9 a federal court of appeals upheld the lower court's exclusion
of lie detector results on the basis that the "test has not yet gained
such standing and scientific recognition among physiological and
psychological authorities as would justify the courts in admitting
expert testimony. . . ,, ,0 Since Frye, American courts have almost
unanimously excluded test results in criminal cases," oftentimes
even when joint stipulations have been made.2
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
5. Id. at 353.
6. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
7. Id. at 764.
8. See generally Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956); People v.
King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1966); State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super.
323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968). See also Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence
in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313 (1964).
9. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
10. Id. at 1014.
11. See. e.g., United States v. Watts, 502 F.2d 726 (9th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Cochran, 499 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1974); Cagle v. State, 132 Ga. App. 227, 207 S.E.2d
703 (1974); State v. Corbin, 285 So. 2d 234 (La. 1973); People v. Levelston, 54 Mich.
477, 221 N.W.2d 235 (1974). Contra, State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962);
People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948) (test results allowed where
defendant was made fully aware of the lie detection process and examiner's qualifica-
tions, and waived his right against self-incrimination); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa
19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960).
12. See State v. Hill, 40 Ohio App. 2d 16, 317 N.E.2d 233 (1974); White v. State,
496 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Cr. App. 1973).
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In light of the constitutional difficulties, it is not surprising that
the state has been allowed to use lie detectors only in compelling
circumstances. The results of lie detector examinations have been
held to be inadmissible in disbarment proceedings, 3 and two jurisdic-
tions have established that refusal by an employee to submit to a lie
detector test is not "misconduct connected with the job" that will bar
a claimant from obtaining unemployment compensation." Moreover,
several federal governmental agencies, including the Defense Depart-
ment, the Commerce Department, the United States Postal Service,
and the Atomic Energy Commission have voluntarily discontinued
the use of the device,' 5 one agency citing "intangible costs in em-
ployee morale" as a major reason for abandoning the test."
Some use of the device by governmental agencies, however, has
withstood legal challenge. Several decisions have upheld the right of
police departments to administer the tests to individual policemen
during internal security investigations. The issue has arisen in Louis-
iana courts four times in recent years," the holdings accurately re-
flecting the majority American view on the question.'8 The leading
case of Roux v. New Orleans Police Department" announced the rule
13. In re Moyer, 77 N.M. 253, 421 P.2d 781 (1966).
14. Swope v. Florida Indus. Comm'n Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Re-
view, 159 So. 2d 653 (Fla. App. 1963); Charles Livingston & Sons, Inc. v. Constance,
185 N.E.2d 655 (Ohio App. 1961).
15. See The Lie Detector as a Surveillance Device, ACLU REPORTS, February,
1973, at 47.
16. Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs as "Lie Detectors" by the Federal Govern-
ment Before the Subcomm. of Foreign Operations and Government Information of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 168 (1964).
17. Frey v. Department of Police, 288 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Dieck
v. Department of Police, 266 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Clayton v. New
Orleans Police Dept., 236 So. 2d 548 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 256 La. 867, 239
So. 2d 363 (1970); Roux v. New Orleans Police Department, 223 So. 2d 905 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969), writ denied, 254 La. 815, 227 So. 2d 148, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008
(1970).
18. See Fichera v. State Personnel Bd., 217 Cal. App. 2d 613, 32 Cal. Rptr. 159
(1963); Coursey v. Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 90 Ill. App. 2d 31, 234 N.E,2d
339 (1967); Seattle Police Officers' Guild v. City of Seattle, 80 Wash. 2d 307, 494 P.2d
485 (1972). See also Kaczkowski v. Board of Fire and Police Comm'rs, 149 N.W.2d 547
(Wis. 1967). The minority view is represented by Molino v. Board of Pub. Safety, 225
A.2d 805 (Conn. 1966), and Stape v. Civil Service Comm'n, 404 Pa. 354, 172 A.2d 161
(1961). Four states provide specific exemptions for tests given policemen in their anti-
polygraph laws. See ALAS. STAT. 23.10.037 (1964); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51g
(1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4666.1 (1969); WASH. REv. CODE § 49.44.120 (1965).
Nebraska law contains a statute specifically requiring all sheriff's employees to submit
to such examinations. NEB. REv. STAT. § 23-1737 (1969).
19. 223 So. 2d 905 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), writ denied, 254 La. 815, 227 So. 2d
148, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1008 (1970).
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that the importance of internal discipline and the overriding public
duty of a policeman to uphold and defend the law makes the refusal
of an order to submit to a test cause for dismissal of the officer."0 The
court recognized in dictum, however, that the officer's "refusal to
obey the order is not evidence of guilt or of knowledge of the guilty
party. '"2"
Although the Constitution affords no bulwark against private
misuse of polygraphs, the policies that underlie the limitations on the
state's use of the device provide strong arguments for protecting indi-
viduals from private action, especially in so vital an area as the em-
ployment relation. The desire to protect employees from unfair treat-
ment has been the basis for major legislation in the sphere of private
employment 2 and has expressed itself in private adjudication. The
largest body of decisional authority on private employer use of the lie
detector exists in the field of labor arbitration. In determining just
cause for dismissal, arbitrators have frequently refused to admit test
results as evidence before arbitral tribunals and have opposed the use
of the device by employers to investigate misconduct and to predicate
discharge of employees.2 3 One rationale suggested for exclusion of
polygraph findings in arbitration proceedings is the general rule that
if the alleged misconduct is of a kind involving an element of moral
turpitude or criminal intent, arbitrators require proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt;24 because the scientific reliability of the test is ques-
20. One supporting reason advanced by the court was that La. Const. art. XIV,
§ 15(P)(1) (1921) required state officials and employees to forfeit their offices if they
refused to testify or to waive immunity from prosecution before any investigative or
judicial tribunal of the state. 223 So. 2d at 908.
21. Id. at 912.
22. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is but one example of government
action in the field of private employment predicated upon the protection of individual
rights. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-15 (1970).
23. It is well established that "no individual's refusal to submit to a lie detector
test should prejudice him in any way." Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 32 Lab.
Arb. 44, 48 (1959). Many arbitrators base their decisions on the negative opinions of
the judiciary regarding the reliability of lie detectors. See, e.g., Bowman Transp., Inc.,
59 Lab. Arb. 283 (1972); Saveway Inwood Serv. Station, 44 Lab. Arb. 709 (1965).
Accordingly, many decisions hold lie detector results to be of no probative value. See,
e.g., Grocers Supply Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 1281 (1972); American Maize-Prod. Co., 45 Lab.
Arb. 1155 (1965). Only one decision was found solidly upholding the right of employers
to force employees to submit to the test. Allen Indus., 26 Lab. Arb. 363 (1956). Five
arbitrators have admitted results of the test as one factor influencing their findings.
American Maize-Prod. Co., 56 Lab. Arb. 421 (1971); Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,
48 Lab. Arb. 1089 (1967); Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 451 (1964); Illinois
Bell Tel. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 471 (1962); Wilkof Steel & Supply Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 883
(1962).
24. See Grocers Supply Co., 59 Lab. Arb. 1280 (1972); Skaggs-Stone, Inc., 40 Lab.
Arb. 1273 (1963); Louis Zahn Drug Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 352, 358 (1963).
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tioned,8 the reasonable doubt standard cannot be satisfied by the
results of the test alone. Aside from the objections centered upon
evidentiary weaknesses of the tests, employer demands to take them
are often viewed as "an invasion of privacy and an unwarranted
exercise of management rights,""5 unless expressly provided for in the
bargaining contract.
The power of arbitrators to exclude lie detector results was up-
held in Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Neuhoff Brothers Packing
Co." The Fifth Circuit, in reversing the district court, found that
although under the collective bargaining agreement the company
expressly reserved the right "to require . . .polygraph tests of an
employee in case the company suspects . . . theft of company prop-
erty," dismissal was to be warranted only for "proper cause." The
court held that the question of whether refusal to submit to the test
was "proper cause" for dismissal was solely for the arbitrator to de-
cide. 8 However, the holding would permit discharge for failing or
refusing to take a lie detector test if it were so stipulated in the
bargaining contract. Such stipulations would not be barred by any
federal law."
25. See, e.g., Bowman Transp. Co., 60 Lab. Arb. 837 (1973); Lag Drug Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 1121 (1962); Dayton Steel Foundry Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 745 (1962); Marathon Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 1040 (1959). The conditions of particular tests have been at
issue in some cases. Spiegel, Inc., 44 Lab. Arb. 405 (1965); Coronet Phosphate Co., 31
Lab. Arb. 515 (1958).
26. Town & Country Food Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 332, 335 (1962). Accord, Lag Drug
Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1121 (1962); General American Transp. Corp., 31 Lab. Arb. 355
(1958). In addition, some arbitrators have indicated a belief that the polygraph in-
fringes upon the employee's right against self-incrimination. Bowman Transp. Co., 60
Lab. Arb. 837 (1973); Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 471, 480 (1962).
27. 481 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1973).
28. Id. at 820. The issue of lie detector use has recently become the subject of
collective bargaining. See The Lie Detector as a Surveillance Device, ACLU REPORTS,
February, 1973, at 55: "One example of such a contract is the agreement between
Retail Store Employees Union Local 1262, AFL-CIO, and the Grand Union Company.
Article 28 of the contract states, 'No employee covered by this agreement shall be
required by any representative of the employer to be the subject of a polygraph test.'"
[Citation omitted.] On the other hand, an arbitrator in Warwick Electronics, Inc.,
46 Lab. Arb. 95 (1965), held that (1) where the contract between the company and the
union stipulated that the security guards involved would "co-operate fully in all inves-
tigations," (2) where the union had been informed by the company that this phrase
meant employee submission to lie detector tests and (3) where the union had ac-
quiesced to the demand during collective bargaining, the "right of guards to refuse to
submit" to the tests had been "waived" by the union. Id. at 101.
29. Twice the General Counsel of the NLRB has refused to deem employer use of
the polygraph an unfair labor practice per se under the provisions of Section 8(a) of
the National Labor Relations Act. Case No. SR-211, 45 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1959); Case
No. F-816, 43 L.R.R.M. 1377 (1958). The Board is firm, however, in its position that
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Frequently, an employer will insist that employees sign a "con-
sent" or "waiver" form agreeing to polygraph testing; this, they
claim, makes the test "voluntary." Arbitrators have expressed a dim
view of this contention, holding in one instance that such a practice
thwarts the process of collective bargaining0 and in another that no
consideration Was given the employee for his acquiescence. 3' The
rationale behind the decisions regarding consent is aptly stated in B.
F. Goodrich Tire Co. 32
The implicit social threat to an employee in the setting of a plant
community were he to refuse to submit to lie detector testing
where crimes have concededly been committed so compels con-
sent that a guiltless but emotionally fearful employee has practi-
cally no choice but to consent . . .3
The decision also held that a "failure" of the test may not be used
as proof of "insubordination" or "refusal to co-operate" by "not tell-
ing the truth."3
For employees who are not protected by collective bargaining
agreements, the impact of lie detector results may prove more harm-
ful. In Peller v. Retail Credit,3 5 a plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted
to invoke the protection of the Fair Credit Reporting Act" to remedy
an alleged misuse of lie detector information. Plaintiff had applied
for a job with Employer 1, but was not hired because he had failed a
pre-employment polygraph test administered by an independent
firm. Shortly afterward, he procured a job with Employer 2, but was
released a few days later because of information obtained from Retail
Credit, a large credit reporting agency, that the test taken for Em-
an employer may not use the failure or refusal to take a lie detector test by an employee
as a pretext for unfair labor practices. See, e.g., National Food Serv., Inc., 196
N.L.R.B. No. 52, 80 L.R.R.M. 1017 (1972); Southwire Co., 159 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 62
L.R.R.M. 1280 (1966). The same is true of employer attempts to use the device to carry
out unfair labor practices. See, e.g., Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., 152 N.L.R.B. No.
43, 59 L.R.R.M. 1157 (1965) (employer threatened to polygraph employees to force
them to "tell the truth about the union").
30. Lag Drug Co., 39 Lab. Arb. 1121, 1122 (1962).
31. Louis Zahn Drug Co., 40 Lab. Arb. 352, 358 (1963).
32. 36 Lab Arb. 552 (1961).
33. Id. at 558. The arbitrator in Goodrich also points out that such consent cannot
operate as an employer recognition of the scientific reliability of the tests or a waiver
of the reasonable doubt standard. Id.
34. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 552, 555 (1961) (arbitrator rejected
company's contention).
35. 359 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681(t) (1970).
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ployer 1 indicated that plaintiff had used marijuana. Employing a
rather questionable construction of the statute, 7 the Georgia federal
district court found the provisions of the F.C.R.A. inapplicable to the
plaintiff's suit for invasion of privacy. The independent lie detection
firm was exempt from the Act's operation because information re-
garding transactions solely between the consumer (plaintiff) and the
person making the report (defendant-lie detection firm) was not regu-
lated under the Act. Employer 1 escaped liability by virtue of the
court's finding that it was not a "consumer reporting agency" within
the meaning of the law, thus freeing its disseminations of information
from scrutiny. Additionally, plaintiff had failed to allege that the
information was furnished with malice or a willful intent to injure
him as required to recover for invasion of privacy and defamation
independent of the provisions of the Act.
Peller represents an abortive attempt to extend some federal
remedy to persons aggrieved by employer use of lie detectors. Despite
a congressional investigation and some proposed legislation," there is
still no federal protection; consequently, fourteen states now have in
force statutes which either prohibit or severely limit the use of the
polygraph in the employment context." Important distinctions in the
37. Section 603 of the Act defines "consumer reporting agency" as "any person
which .. . regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or
evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the
purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties. ... 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f)
(1970). Thus, Employer 1 could easily be deemed a "consumer reporting agency" if it
furnished such information on its prospective employees to third parties on a regular
basis, even if such activity was not the central purpose of its business. That a future
reversal of the holding in Peller is possible is further evidenced by the announced
purposes of the F.C.R.A. to insure accuracy, relevancy, and personal privacy in credit
reporting. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1970).
38. The first significant congressional action on the subject of lie detectors came
in 1963 when the House Government Operations Committee held an eleven day inves-
tigation which revealed widespread use of the device by the federal government.
Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs as "Lie Detectors" by the Federal Government
Before the Subcomm. of Foreign Operations and Government Information of the House
Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). Recently, two bills
have been introduced to limit the use of the lie detector in federal employment: S.
1035, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 1438, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971). Another bill,
introduced by former Senator Sam Ervin, would have prohibited polygraphs in all
industries affecting commerce. S. 2156, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
39. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1964); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (West 1953); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51g (1967); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 705 (1953); HAWAII REv.
LAWS § 378-21 (1965); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-903, 44-904 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §
95 (1966); MASS. GEN. LAW. ch. 149, § 19 (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.75 (1973);
N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:170-90.1 (1966); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 659.225, 659.990 (1963); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4666.1 (1969); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-6.1-1, 28-6.1-2 (1964);
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wording of these statutes reflect their relative strength based on the
spectrum of employer conduct regulated. Five states prohibit the
employer from "requiring" the test 0 and two prevent him from "de-
manding or requiring."" Such language has been interpreted to allow
the employer to "ask or request" submission to a polygraph test, the
tests being permitted when they are "voluntary."" Minnesota and
New Jersey have the most inclusive bans on employers' use of the lie
detector: Minnesota prohibits "requiring" or "requesting" by "indi-
rect or direct coercion"; New Jersey outlaws "influencing, requesting,
or requiring" polygraph tests.
In State v. Community Distributors, Inc.,' 3 the New Jersey
courts passed upon the issue of what degree of coercion was necessary
to constitute an "influencing" or a "request." The defendant-
employer pleaded his innocence, claiming he had merely "inquired
of" employees whether they would "volunteer" for testing. The courts
dismissed this argument, the lower court explaining:
It is eminently clear that, although defendant's prospective em-
ployees are only "requested" to submit to lie detector tests, they
are in fact "influenced" to do so psychologically by being intro-
duced to an establishment where many employees take the
tests."
In the same case, defendant also challenged the antipolygraph
statute on the grounds that it deprived employers of property without
due process of law. In dismissing the challenge, the state courts recog-
nized the legitimate state interest sought to be protected,45 and found
sufficient reasonableness in the exercise of the state's police power.'
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 49.44.120, 49.44.130 (1963) [hereinafter cited by state name
only]. In response to the problem of polygraph test results, Minnesota has enacted,
with its prohibitory law, a ban on the disclosure of test results by any person except
with consent of the person tested. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.76 (1973). A number of
American cities have also passed anti-polygraph ordinances. Among them are Balti-
more, Cincinnati, Akron, Madison, and Shively, Kentucky. See The Lie Detector as a
Surveillance Device, ACLU REPORTS, February, 1973, at 51.
40. Hawaii, Idaho, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Washington.
41. California, Maryland. "Subjecting or causing" is used by Massachusetts and
Rhode Island, while Alaska, Connecticut and Delaware go a bit further and ban "re-
quiring," "requesting," or "suggesting" in various combinations.
42. 43 Op. CAL. Arv. GEN. 25 (1964).
43. 123 N.J. Super. 589, 304 A.2d 213 (County Ct. 1973), aff'd, 64 N.J. 479, 317
A.2d 697 (1974).
44. Id. at 598, 304 A.2d at 218.
45. Id. at 594, 304 A.2d at 216.
46. State v. Community Dist., Inc., 64 N.J. at 487, 317 A.2d at 701.
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The New Jersey statute thus seems to provide adequate protection
for the individual and should serve as a model for states contemplat-
ing regulation in the area."
In addition to the states which have enacted prohibitory laws
regarding lie detector use by employers, eleven states have chosen to
regulate lie detectors by licensing firms and operators." A significant
need exists to upgrade the quality of many examiners, 9 the vast
majority of whom are subject to no legal regulation, despite the
suggestion that to license lie detection firms and operators is to con-
cede the legitimacy of the process.5"
47. Other considerations may also prove important in the operation of these laws.
With regard to the individuals subject to the laws, some states specify only "employ-
ers." (California, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey). Others regulate any
"agent" of the employer (Alaska, Minnesota, Oregon, Pennsylvania), while a few limit
"individuals," "firms," "corporations," or "any business entity" from testing activity.
(Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Washington). Various individuals are protected under
the laws. Three statutes provide that "no employee" shall be subject to the tests
(Hawaii, Oregon, Pennsylvania). Others protect "prospective employees" or "persons"
(Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Washington). Submission to or passage of a lie detector test cannot be a "condi-
tion for employment" or "condition for continued employment" under the laws of
several states. (Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland,
New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington). With regard to ex-
emptions, "local" and "state" governmental agencies are exempted in California,
Connecticut, and Maryland. The laws of Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Pennsylvania
and Washington exempt law enforcement agencies. Employment involving narcotic
drugs is exempted by Pennsylvania and Washington. Minnesota and New Jersey have
no exemptions in their laws. Most statutes declare violations misdemeanors. See, e.g.,
Alaska, California, Maryland, Washington. See also New Jersey (violators deemed
"disorderly persons").
48. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-2201-2225 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.40-.56
(1967); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-5001-5016 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 201-1-30
(1963); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 329.010-.990 (1962); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 39.8920-61-84
(1968); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 648.005-.210 (1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 67-31-4-14
(1963); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 43-31-01-17 (1965); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 4413 (29cc)
(1971); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-729.01-.018 (1968). The power to so regulate lie detector
operators has been held to be within the bounds of the state police power. See Dovalina
v. Albert, 409 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966). But see Fletcher v. State, 439 S.W.2d
656 (Tex. 1969) (declared Polygraph Examiners Act unconstitutional for failure of title
to give notice to all persons regulated under the Act).
49. One of the foremost authorities on and commercial proponents of the lie detec-
tor, Professor Fred Inbau of Northwestern University Law School, conceded before the
Moss Subcommittee that approximately 80% of all polygraph operators were incompe-
tent. Hearings on Polygraphs, supra note 16, at 8.
50. But see, e.g., In re Mayer, 77 N.M. 253, 255, 421 P.2d 781, 783 (1966), where
a New Mexico court stated in response to a request for admission of test results: "The
fact that the New Mexico legislature .. .has seen fit to license and regulate poly-
graphy in no sense raises that profession. . . to such scientific dignity as would justify
[Vol. 35
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Although Louisiana has no express regulation of lie detectors, the
newly adopted Constitution may provide a remedy to employees and
others injured by private lie detector use. A constitutional right
against "invasions of privacy" is now explicitly mandated by Section
V of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution and at least one
commentator has suggested that this protection is applicable to pri-
vate action.5
Absent a state statute strictly prohibiting employer use of lie
detectors, the practical remedies afforded by the law to an individual
employee are few. No federal law exists on point and only fourteen
states have protective laws, many of which exempt from coverage
vast sections of the working force. While unions may effectively bar
the use of the device through collective bargaining agreements, a
great number of American workers are not affiliated with labor
unions. Thus, the legal setting is ripe for legislative action which
would reconcile the rights of employer and employee with respect to
the lie detector. The proposal rejected by the 1974 legislature would
have so reconciled this conflict in favor of the privacy of the individ-
ual worker; it is hoped that a similar proposal will be enacted soon.
James P. Lambert
SEX DISCRIMINATION: AD Hoc REVIEW IN THE HIGHEST COURT
Since its landmark decision in Reed v. Reed' in 1971, the United
States Supreme Court has been reluctant to explain the extent to
which the equal protection clause dictates the design of legislation
employing sex-based classifications. In three recent cases,2 the Court
has continued its seemingly ad hoc approach to sex discrimination
claims, insuring further inconsistencies in lower court review of such
claims. Although the challenged statutes were upheld in each in-
our recognition of the results as admissible evidence." See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-
2225 (1967).
51. See Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (1974).
1. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Until Reed, the Court gave sex discrimination claims only
passing review. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (statute exempting women from
jury duty upheld); Geosaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (denial of bartending license
to women upheld); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upheld maximum hour law
for women); Minor v. Happersatt, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (statute denying
women the vote upheld); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872) (statute
denying women admission to the bar upheld).
2. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484
(1974); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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